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THE ROLE OF PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITY IN
CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND
PRACTICE IN LONG-TERM CARE
Marshall B. Kapp, J.D., M.P.H.*

INTRODUCTION

My friend and nationally respected aging policy analyst Dr.
Larry Polivka is absolutely correct about the very important goal
of closing the gap between knowledge and practice in the United
States long-term care financing and delivery system.' He is also
correct about many of the challenges that must be surmounted if
we are to reasonably achieve this paramount objective in time to
Dr. Polivka offers a
avert social and political disaster.
straightforward public policy prescription for overcoming the
current challenges; although I concur with certain aspects of his
policy prescription, it is his overwhelming emphasis on the
public sector while substantially minimizing private sector
potential with which I must find fault.
I briefly enumerate in the next section some basic points of
congruence between Dr. Polivka's viewpoint and my own. I
then offer, in response to his policy recommendations, my own
ideas about the significance of personal responsibility as a vital

* Marshall Kapp is the Garwin Distinguished Professor of Law and Medicine,
Southern Illinois University School of Law and School of Medicine.
1. Larry Polivka, Closing the Gap Between Knowledge and Practice in the U.S.
Long-Term Care System, 10 ELDER'S ADVISOR (forthcoming Jan. 2008). Dr. Polivka
uses the word "system" to describe the long-term care picture in the United States,
although that word is not really an accurate descriptor for the present situation. See
generally Martin Kitchener & Charlene Harrington, U.S. Long-Term Care: A Dialectic
Analysis of Institutional Dynamics, 45 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 87 (2004). For

reasons made clear below, I prefer to characterize the long-term care picture as a
"marketplace" rather than a "system".
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component of any appropriate strategy for moving the United
States away from our present long-term care practice, toward a
financing and delivery paradigm that is more attuned to the
kinds of care we should be making available to older and
disabled individuals needing help in navigating the inevitable
vicissitudes of daily living.2
WHAT WE KNOW: POINTS OF AGREEMENT

There is probably little serious dispute, even by the
professional representatives of the American nursing home
industry,3 that-as thoroughly documented by Dr. Polivka 4-- we
know by now that it is better for most people needing long-term
care to receive that care in home and community-based settings
rather than in nursing homes.' In other words, it is best in terms
of individual and family desires,6 as well as considerations of
quality and economic efficiency,7 to minimize (and ideally
eliminate altogether) premature or unnecessary admissions to
2. "The estimated 10 million Americans with long-term care needs today are
not all alike. Indeed, there are many different 'paths' to dependency and the
services such dependency requires." EDWARD ALAN MILLER & VINCENT MOR, OUT
OF THE SHADOWS: ENvISIONING A BRIGHTER FUTURE FOR LONG-TERM CARE IN
AMERICA, A Brown University Report for the National Commission for Quality Long-

Term Care 14 (2006), http://qualitylongtermcarecommission.org/pdf/out-ofisolation.pdf.
3. The primary national trade associations advocating the positions of the
American nursing home industry are the American Health Care Association
(AHCA), http://www.ahcancal.org (last visited August 26, 2008), and the American
Association of Homes and Services for the Aging (AAHSA), http://www.aahsa.org
(last visited August 26, 2008). AHCA represents both for-profit and not-for-profit
nursing homes. AAHSA represents only not-for-profit entities.
4. See Polivka, supra note 1.
5. See Kevin Eckert et al., Preferences for Receipt of Care Among CommunityDwelling Adults, 16 J.AGING & SOC. POL'Y 49 (2004); Michelle Doty et al., Health Care
Opinion Leaders' Views on the Future of Long-Term Care, Commonwealth Fund Data
Brief, Pub. 1157, Vol. 10, 3 (July 2008). Even AHCA now includes as members,
besides its nursing home core, assisted living and subacute care providers. See
http://www.ahca.org/aboutahca (last visited August 26, 2008). AAHSA, in
addition to its nursing home base, also represents adult day care providers, home
health agencies, assisted living facilities, continuing care retirement communities,
senior housing providers, and adult community centers.
6. See Eckert et al., supra note 5, at 60.
7. See generally Glenn Mitchell et al., The Relative Benefits and Cost of Medicaid
Home and Community-Based Services in Florida, 46 GERONTOLOGIST 483 (2006).
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nursing homes and to reduce the lengths of stay following
necessary admissions as much as possible.
We also know, albeit unhappily, that too many public and
private dollars being used to purchase long-term care today
continue to go toward paying for nursing home care 8 despite the
largely successful efforts of the American aging enterprise9 to
keep, or move, many extremely disabled persons out of nursing
homes and to care (quite adequately for those clients) in home
and community-based settings. 0 Put differently, perhaps the
major gap between knowledge and practice is the disparity
between long-term care service delivery, on one hand, and the
allocation and expenditure of financial resources devoted to
buying long-term care, on the other; succinctly, the money has
not followed the clients."
Unless this gap (which in many states is really more of a
chasm) 12 is addressed effectively and expeditiously, American
society runs the substantial risk of repeating many of the same
mistakes that were made as part of the concerted, largely
to
movement
flawed
deeply
litigation-assisted,
deinstitutionalize huge state mental illness institutions in the late
1960s and the 1970s. 13 It was a social movement in which the
8. In fiscal year 2005, the national Medicaid spending for home and
community-based long-term care amounted to just 37% of total Medicaid spending
for long-term care, even though fewer than 5% of Americans over age 65 are
nursing home residents at any particular moment. ARI HOUSER ET AL., ACROSS THE
STATES: PROFILES OF LONG-TERM CARE AND INDEPENDENT LIVING 11, AARP Pub.
Pol'y Inst. 10 (71h ed. 2006).
9. This phrase is borrowed from CAROLL L. ESTES, THE AGING ENTERPRISE
(1979).

10. See Martin Kitchener et al., Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services:
National Program Trends, 24 HEALTH AFF. 206, 207 (2005).
11. See generally ENID KASSNER ET AL., A BALANCING ACT: STATE LONG-TERM
CARE REFORM, AARP Public Pol'y Inst. #2008-10 (July 2008) (examining Medicaid
long-term care spending for older people with physical disabilities).
12. For example, in fiscal year 2005, Mississippi Medicaid spending for home
and community based long-term care amounted to only 13% of its total Medicaid
long-term care spending. For the District of Columbia, the figure was just 16%.
HOUSER ET AL., supra note 8, at 11. But see generally Tracy Bach, Choices for Care:

Consumer Choice and State Policymaking Courage Amid Medicaid's Shifting Entitlement
to Long-Term Care, 9 ELDER'S ADVISOR 269 (2008) (describing the Vermont Medicaid
waiver success story).
13. See generally DEINSTITUTIONALIZING LONG-TERM CARE: MAIGNG LEGAL

122

MARQUETTE ELDER'S ADVISOR

[Vol. 10

failure of sufficient public dollars to accompany the people who
were swept or kept out of the public institutions resulted not in
would-be institutionalized mental patients becoming happily
and productively integrated into a welcoming community
environment, but rather in de facto trans-institutionalization of
the erstwhile mental institution population into homeless
shelters, the criminal justice system, or nursing homes.14
Dr. Polivka is on the mark in identifying and lamenting this
gap in the current long-term care context. Nonetheless, a couple
of cautions ought to be considered by those who might be too
intent on quickly and aggressively eliminating the
disequilibrium between long-term care client need and the
funding to address that need. First, despite enormous progress
in the capacity of home and community-based long-term care
providers to serve very disabled individuals outside of nursing
homes, it is inevitable that there will always be some peoplebecause of a combination of chronic, severe disabling conditions
and the lack of an adequate family and community support
structure-who will need nursing home care for some period of
time during their lives.'5 We must be careful to fund surviving
nursing homes sufficiently well so that they can provide decent
care for the residents who need to be cared for there on either a
short-term or lengthy basis.' 6
Second, we should not be overly optimistic about the likely
impact of the United States Supreme Court's 1999 decision in
STRIDES, AVOIDING POLICY ERRORS (Marshall B. Kapp ed. 2005) (examining the

challenges entailed in substituting home and community-based long-term care for
nursing home admission as long as possible for severely disabled older people).
14. See, e.g., PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH
LAW AND THE LIMITS OF CHANGE 49-52, 217 (1994); RAEL JEAN ISAAC & VIRGINIA C.
ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS: How PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW ABANDONED
THE MENTALLY ILL 7 (1990).

15. Judith Kasper, Who Stays and Who Goes Home: Using National Data on
Nursing Home Discharges and Long-Stay Residents to Draw Implications for Nursing
Home TransitionPrograms,Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Rpt.
#7386, available at http://www.kff.org (last visited August 26, 2008).
16. Joshua M. Wiener, An Assessment of Strategiesfor Improving Quality of Care in
Nursing Homes, 43 Special Issue, GERONTOLOGIST 19, 24 (2003) ( "The nursing home
industry has warned that Medicaid reimbursement rates are already too low and
that further reductions would adversely affect the quality of care.").
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Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring on radically transforming the
American long-term care financing scenario.17
The Court
majority interpreted Title II of the Americans With Disabilities
Act and its implementing regulations to require that, when the
government finances services for a disabled person (such as
states do when they subsidize long-term care through their
respective Medicaid programs), the purchased services must be
provided in the most integrated, least restrictive available setting
consistent with the disabled person's needs.18 This judicial
decision has spawned significant activity at both the national
and state levels aimed at exploring alternatives to nursing home
placements for many chronically disabled individuals.1 9
Nevertheless, as earlier social activists in other contexts
ultimately came to learn when they sought to use litigation as an
instrument to reform institutions such as schools, prisons, and
hospitals for the mental ill and developmentally disabled, the
judicial branch of government lacks any legal power to
authorize or appropriate the expenditure of funds; that spending
function is solely the province of the politically accountable
legislative branch of government. 20 Thus, in light of the
American constitutional concept of separation of powers, 21 the
judiciary may proclaim ambitious constitutional or statutory
rights and responsibilities, but only the legislature has the power
to spend whatever money is necessary to actually effectuate
those judicially enunciated rights and responsibilities. 22
Consequently, the potential for bold systemic or marketplace
change embodied in the Olmstead precedent is not self-executing.

17. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 604 (1999).
18. See id. at 587-601.
19. U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., OFF. CIVIL RIGHTS, PREVENTING
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN HEALTH CARE AND SOCIAL
SERVICES: SERVING PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN THE MOST INTEGRATED SETTING-OLMSTEAD AND THE NEW FREEDOM INITIATIVE, available at http://www.hhs.

gov/ocr/mis.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2008).
20. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 1-3 (1991).
21. JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES, COMMENTS,
QUESTIONS 151-220 (101h ed. 2006).

22. ROSENBERG, supra note 20.
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With those caveats in mind, then, I endorse Dr. Polivka's
call for a hearty (and thus far largely absent outside the
boundaries of academic journals and conferences) 23 national
conversation regarding the optimal mix of public and private
responsibility 24 for correcting the gap between what we know
about where long-term care should be provided (and where it
increasingly is being provided), on one hand, and our continued
tangible spending patterns skewed toward institutional
providers, on the other. Dr. Polivka and I diverge somewhat,
however, in our respective views about the specific policies
toward which that needed national conversation ultimately
ought to lead.
POLICY CHOICES:

LEVERAGING

PUBLIC AND

PRIVATE

RESPONSIBILITY

The broad policy alternatives available for addressing the
gap between knowledge and practice in United States long-term
care, that is, for addressing the problem of dollars not following
the clients in need, are rather limited. I presume that Dr. Polivka
and I would concur, as would virtually everyone else except the
most extreme libertarian thinkers, 25 that simply abandoning
older disabled individuals totally to their own luck in
weathering the contingencies of life-as those contingencies of
health and wealth might apply to long-term care needs-is not a
viable ethical and political option. Eliminating the survival-of-

23. David G. Stevenson, Planning for the Future--Long-Term Care and the 2008
Election, 358 N. ENG. J. MED. 1985, 1985 (2008)( "[Tihe candidates in the 2008
presidential race have been virtually silent about long-term care policy. Health care
received substantial attention during the 35 Democratic and Republican [primary]
debates (garnering more than 1000 mentions), but almost nothing has been said
about long-term care.").
24. A mixture of public and private responsibility for long-term care builds
upon a rich precedent demonstrated in the history of American health care policy.
See, e.g., ROSEMARY STEVENS, THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE HEALTH CARE STATE: ESSAYS ON
THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE POuCY (2007).
25. For a libertarian approach to health care, see, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE? (1999).
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the-fittest approach of social Darwinism2 6 from the conversation
essentially leaves three possibilities on the policymaking table:
"enhancing private long-term care insurance, replacing the
current welfare-based system with a public social insurance
program, and introducing a hybrid public-private system." 27
I present public and private responsibility here in a
basically dyadic, either/or way, but of course in this arena they
are not mutually exclusive. Rather, these approaches need to be
symbiotic and mutually reinforcing.28
Any solution will require shared responsibility among
individuals, families, and government. However, the
mechanisms that would be needed to extend the
Medicaid safety net or to create a new benefit under
Medicare, as well as the trade-offs inherent in such
moves, differ substantially from those that would be
needed to expand incentives for private long-term care
insurance or to offer greater support to informal
caregivers.
The former strategies emphasize
government's role in targeting a defined set of services
to those in need, whereas the latter strategies primarily
subsidize the ability of individuals and families to meet
their own current or future care needs. 29
PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY
Dr. Polivka argues in favor of establishing a universal, nonmeans tested social insurance program as a primary vehicle to
finance long-term care in the United States.30 As a first (rather
than a last or catastrophic) resort, this proposal is seriously
flawed. A broadly expanded entitlement program of the sort
advocated would impose an enormous financial burden on
26. See e.g. DAVID P. CROOK, DARWIN'S COAT-TAILS:
DARWINISM (2007).

ESSAYS ON SOCIAL

27. Howard Gleckman, How Can We Improve Long-Term Care Financing? Boston
College Center for Retirement Research, Number 8-8, 1 (June 2008).
28. Doty et al., supra note 5, at 3 ("[Tlhe most endorsed approach among
leaders from all sectors is that government and individuals should share the
responsibility for paying for long-term care.").
29. Stevenson, supra note 23, at 1987.
30. Polivka, supra note 1.
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future generations, on top of all the other suffocating financial
burdens31 that the Baby Boomers have already heaped upon
those who will follow us. 32 Even putting aside fundamental
moral principles of social justice as they apply to those who
contribute the most resources to society,33 basic considerations of
fiscal prudence and political accommodation counsel against
such an intrusive approach.
Yet another permanent,
uncontrollable assault on the federal and state budgets-and
thus on the taxpaying segment of the American public-would
threaten, perhaps beyond repair, the delicate intergenerational
balance that is increasingly strained by the insatiable entitlement
obligations of Medicare and Social Security. 34
The common response to these concerns, that any potential
intergenerational inequity problem could be avoided or
substantially mitigated if only current federal budget priorities
were wholly rearranged (i.e., if funds were diverted from the
Departments of Defense and Homeland Security to expanded
social welfare programs), is unconvincing. Although budget
priorities are a legitimate topic for robust, continuing public

31. See PHILLIP LONGMAN, BORN TO PAY: THE NEW POLITICS OF AGING IN
AMERICA (1987).
32. I say "us" because, as a matter of full disclosure, I am a member of the Baby
Boom generation and quickly approaching an age category placing me at increased
risk of needing long-term care.
33. See generally JUSTICE ACROSS GENERATIONS: WHAT DOES IT MEAN? (Lee M.
Cohen ed., 1993).
34. See SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES, STATUS OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE PROGRAMS (2008), available at http://www.ssa.gov/
OACT/TRSUM/index.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2008) (detailing the precarious
financial positions of these programs). See generally PHILLIP LONGMAN, THE
RETURN OF THRIFT: HOW THE COMING COLLAPSE OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS WELFARE
STATE WILL REAWAKEN VALUES IN AMERICA (1996); MILLER & MOR, supra note 2, at
33:
Fundamental to these discussions [about long-term care financing] will be
the level of inter- versus intra-generational transfer. Social Security,
Medicare, and Medicaid are all "pay-as-you-go" programs, with current
generations of workers paying the benefits of today's elderly and disabled.
To add long-term care to these existing entitlements as a largely intergenerationally financed program might be particularly difficult for the
majority of workers whose wages have not grown substantially in the past
decade and who need to continue to purchase health insurance for their
own families.
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debate, altering those priorities-even radically-would hardly

eliminate the reality of finite (albeit more abundant) resources
available to be spent on long-term care for an aging population;
consequently, there will be a need at some juncture for difficult
choices-put bluntly, for rationing decisions. In the final
analysis, demand always will exceed supply, even if there were
a much greater supply of resources than current budgetary
priorities now make available. 35
Moreover, a universal social insurance entitlement program
for long-term care would eliminate or greatly discourage private
responsibility even more than the current combination of
Medicaid availability and learned public complacency has
already exerted a "crowding out" effect.36 The crowding out
impact of a completely government financed program on the
willingness of individuals to shoulder any personal
responsibility to save or invest money or purchase private
insurance policies to prepare for their future needs would be
inevitable,37 unless the guaranteed public benefit coverage turns
out to be so deficient that consumers feel the need to escape or
supplement the public system.38 Given the enormous, and
35. Regarding rationing of care in the long-term care context, see, e.g., Jane
Aronson, Silenced Complaints, Suppressed Explanations: The Cumulative Effects of Home
Care Rationing, 36 INT'L J. HEALTH SERV. 535, 536-37 (2006); Diane Morin & Nancy
Leblanc, Less Money, Less Care: How Nurses in Long-Term Care Allocate Hours of
Needed Care in a Context of Chronic Shortage, 11 INT.'L J. NURS. PRAC. 214, 215 (2005);
William Weissert et al., Titrating Versus Targeting Home Care Services to Frail Elderly
Clients: An Application of Agency Theory and Cost-Benefit Analysis to Home Care Policy,
15 J. AGING HEALTH 99, 99-101 (2003).

36. Regarding the "crowding out" effect, see generally Cong. Budget Off.,
FINANCING LONG-TERM CARE FOR THE ELDERLY xi (2004); cf. David Baer, Establishing

a Moral Duty to Obey the Law Through a Jurisprudenceof Law and Economics, 34 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 491, 500 (2007) ("[Elven when benefits are directly and voluntarily
received, because the government has monopolized the market by crowding out all
other alternatives, there is no choice for individuals but to accept its services.").
37. Cf Colin Brown, Minister Rules Out Free Care for Elderly, THE INDEPENDENT,
May 13, 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics (last visited Sept.
14, 2008) (quoting the British Prime Minister, in the context of rejecting total

government funding of social care for older persons, stating that it was essential
that those people who worked hard and saved for retirement be treated fairly).
38. We have certainly seen such opting out of a universal entitlement system
because of the perceived deficiency of the public benefit package in other contexts,
such as primary and secondary education. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education

Off the Grid: Constitutional Constraints on Homeschooling, 96 CAL. L. REV. 123, 123
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indeed ultimately unsustainable, financial burden that a
universal social insurance entitlement program for long-term
care would place on the involuntary backs of taxpaying
members of future generations, crowding out the private
sector-an objective explicitly embraced by Dr. Polivka and
other universal entitlement advocates-seems to be the last, not
the first, result we should be seeking.
PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITY

Thus, excessive reliance on public responsibility is highly
problematic. The alternative, preferable policy direction is to
encourage and facilitate more individual responsibility for
advance planning, through various savings and investment
vehicles (including Health Savings Accounts (HSAs))39 and the
purchase of private long-term care insurance, 40 in anticipation of
eventual long-term care expenses.
When we target Medicaid's scarce resources to the
genuinely needy, those needy will get better care across
a wider spectrum of services. When more people pay
privately for long-term care, they will command redcarpet to top-quality care at the most appropriate level
of care. When people with money have to pay for their
own long-term care, they will buy long-term care
insurance and use their home equity, which means
those businesses will boom, provide more jobs, and pay
more taxes. When long-term care providers have more
private payers, nursing homes, assisted living facilities,
and all other caregivers will be more financially
solvent. Debt and equity capital, which are desperately
(2008).

39. See Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS:
PARTICIPATION INCREASED AND WAS MORE COMMON AMONG INDIVIDUALS WITH
HIGHER INCOMES, GAO-08-474R (2008); J.M. Razor, Health Savings Accounts:
Increasing Health Care Access in America, 17 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 419, 434-35
(2005). But see Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and Peril of Ownership Society Health
Care Policy, 80 TUL. L. REV. 777, 836-37 (2006) (contending that HSAs and other

components of consumer-driven health care will fail to achieve meaningful health
care reform).
40. Stephen A. Moses, The Brave New World of Long-Term Care, 21 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 561, 567 (2007).
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needed to finance the construction and operation of
long-term care facilities, will return to the
marketplace.4 '
There are a number of strategies that might be employed to
move more individuals toward planning responsibly and timely
for their own future long-term care financial needs, including
the provision of individual or employer tax incentives
(deductions or direct credits) to create incentives for those
individuals who save money42 and/or purchase private
insurance policies. 43 Certainly, it would be unfair to drastically
curtail public spending for long-term care too quickly. That
action would seriously and unjustly disadvantage a current
older age cohort that has miserably failed to plan adequately for
its own long-term care contingencies largely because of repeated
"don't worry, be happy" assurances by public officials and
academic commentators that the government could be
depended upon to generously fulfill all their needs (if not all
their desires) .44 There is no good reason, though, that-if given
sufficient advance notice, incentive, and opportunity -today's
younger population, with many likely healthy and economically
productive years ahead of them in which to make and effect
sound financial planning choices, should not be expectedindeed required-to make and effect choices that direct a
reasonable amount of private resources toward the long-term
care needs of the individual saver/insurance policy purchaser.
Contrary populist claims notwithstanding, policy initiatives
emphasizing and encouraging more private responsibility for
anticipating and preparing for long-term care expenses do not

41. Id.
42. See, e.g., GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 39; Edward A. Zelinsky,
The Defined ContributionParadigm,114 YALE L.J. 451 (2004).
43. See LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & RICHARD L. KAPLAN, ELDER LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 146-49 (3" ed. 2003) (discussing "tax qualified" long-term care insurance

policies).
44. As Alexis de Toqueville warned several hundred years ago, "The American
Republic will endure until the day Congress discovers that it can bribe the public
Brainy Quote, http://www.brainyquote.com
with the public's money."
/quotes/authors/a/alexis-de-tocqueville.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2008).
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equal the abandonment of poor people. The autonomy and
dignity of individuals -regardless of their current45 financial
status-is served, not hindered, by making long-term care
financing alternatives available to them that reduce their reliance
on the vagaries and risks" 6 of government safety net programs.
As a matter of fact, instead of equating the absence of complete
government hegemony with a calculated neglect of the less
fortunate, society's commitment to the general welfare could be
optimized by using public dollars to leverage private dollars to
economically empower people who otherwise would lack
sufficient personal resources to control their own long-term care
destinies.
Public dollars could be employed to subsidize (or, in a more
extreme version, mandate)"7 individuals to purchase private
long-term care insurance, thereby overcoming one of the chief,
obvious current barriers to purchase: high premium costs.
Public dollars can also work to leverage private resources if they
are used to provide objective, comprehensive information and
counseling to prospective long-term care insurance purchasers,
thereby eliminating or reducing the impediment to private
responsibility now imposed by consumers' perceptions of
45. In the United States, there is opportunity for the movement of individuals
from one economic stratum to another. See generally DOWELL MYERS, IMMIGRANTS
AND BOOMERS: FORGING A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR THE FUTURE OF AMERICA

(2007). Commentators (representing the overwhelming majority of the academic
community) who prefer to keep individuals permanently dependent on
government largess rather than to empower them tend to disparage the possibilities
of upward mobility. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, The Myth of Upward Mobility, 68 U.
PITT. L. REV. 879, 883 (2007).
46. See generally DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE

ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 294-95 (2002) (discussing government's weaknesses as a
risk manager).
47. Lawrence A. Frolik, An Essay on the Need for Subsidized, Mandatory LongTerm Care Insurance, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 517, 533-35 (2007);

Diane L. Dick, Tax and Economic Policy Responses to the Medicaid Long-Term Care
Financing Crisis: A Behavioral Economics Approach, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y &
ETHICS J. 379, 387 (2007) (advocating "that federal and state governments work
together to develop a universal compulsory [long-term care insurance] program, so
that consumers are obligated to make a relatively small present-day sacrifice to
provide benefits for the future incapacitated self."); id. at 420-21 ("When consumer
choice cannot be sufficiently modified to achieve the desired governmental
outcome, a compulsory program may be necessary.").
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insufficient unbiased information available to enable intelligent
comparisons among competing investment and long-term care
insurance products.
The United States will continue to need, as Dr. Polivka
convincingly emphasizes, a social safety net regarding long-term
care. However, the safety net concept implies a fallback last
resort, to be relied upon only when other alternatives have
Dependence upon the government qua protective
failed.48
intrusive nanny may be minimized by treating individuals who
legitimately need public subsidies as consumers to be
empowered with prodding and support, but not coercion, to
plan and act in a timely fashion, rather than by relegating them
to the diminished status of public wards eager to be infantilized.
An important problem with the personal responsibility
argument, as Dr. Polivka forcefully notes and I readily but
reluctantly acknowledge, is that thus far the private sector-and
especially the private long-term care insurance industry-has
not shown itself to be up to the formidable but important task
outlined above. For several reasons, the available private longterm care insurance products marketed have not been very
attractive heretofore to a significant percentage of potential
consumers.5 0 For one thing, premium prices have been very
expensive, in large part because of an adverse selection problem
consisting of insurance policies being bought primarily by those
who are most likely to file claims for benefits; 5' insurers have,
quite literally, priced themselves out of the market.5 2 Second,

48. See MOSS, supra note 46, at 294-95 (the government is weak as a risk
manager, and risk-management policies could unleash moral hazard).
49. See Jonathan Garthwaite, ABC News, Nanny State, USA: We should expect
available
at
officials,
our
government
ourselves
and
more
from
http://abcnews.go.com/US/Story?id=2995594&page=1 (last visited Sept. 22, 2008) (If
you want a dictionary definition, 'A government perceived as having excessive
interest in or control over the welfare of its citizens, especially in the enforcement of
extensive public health and safety regulations.' A shorter version might be:
Government acting like your mommy -- like a nanny.").
50. Leslie A. Curry et al., Individual Decisionmaking in the Non-Purchaseof LongTerm Care Insurance,49 GERONTOLOGIST (forthcoming May 2009).
51. Frolik, supra note 47, at 529-30.
52. "Pricing out of the market" is an idiom meaning "to eliminate the demand
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long-term care insurance is unavailable to many potential
consumers at any price (or at the least, at nearly any price)
because insurers have imposed extremely stringent medical
eligibility standards for underwriting individual policies. The
coverage limits contained in many policies offered for sale are
too limited in the typical consumer's eye to make the probable
benefits of owning a policy worth the certain costs.
For private responsibility to succeed as a reasonable, indeed
desirable, alternative to a totally public long-term care financing
system, it will be incumbent upon the American insurance
industry to develop and offer an array of desirable quality
products at an affordable price to enough customers, along with
sufficient, comprehensible, accurate information to enable
intelligent, voluntary shopping within the long-term care
financing marketplace by those potential customers. If the
private sector can rise to this challenge and public policy
supports (as it should)53 the private options thus made
available, 54 those private initiatives will succeed. If, however,
the private long-term care insurance industry finds that the
challenges of adverse selection, high care costs, 5 and objective
information needs are insurmountable in the face of the
industry's legitimate profit objectives, then the private portion of
the private/public partnership will fail-as well it should in a
properly functioning free enterprise system that punishes the
The Free Dictionary,
for goods or services by setting prices too high."
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/pricing+out+of+the+market (last visited Nov. 6,
2008).
53. One of the ancillary benefits of a combined private/public long-term care
insurance marketplace is "that partnerships of this type also present an opportunity
for consumer-protective regulation of the insurance industry if certain conditions
are met." Note, Public-Private Partnerships and Insurance Regulation, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1367, 1368 (2008).
54. Besides using tax policy to create incentives for the purchase of private
products, "[flor long-term care insurance to play an important role, government
needs to foster genuine price competition and better informed consumers." Richard
L. Kaplan, Retirement Planning's Greatest Gap: Funding Long-Term Care, 11 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 407, 449 (2007).
55. "The cost of providing long-term care to all those who require it is
immense." Alissa E. Halperin et al., Medicare Advantage Special Needs Plans for
"Institutionalized Individuals": What Advantage to Enrollment?, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 175, 175 (2007).
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failure to satisfy consumer demands effectively, efficiently, and
affordably.

CONCLUSION
There is a rapidly growing need in the United States for
long-term care services of various types for an expanding
population of older and younger disabled individuals. This
situation presents many difficult questions, not the least of
which concerns how the needed services will be financed. There
is substantial public sentiment for some sort of private/public
collaborative effort to respond to the financing challenge. The
threshold unresolved issue is the shape and contours of that
collaboration.
Proponents of a broad, first-resort governmental financing
role- articulately

represented

by

Dr. Polivka-portray

the

future of long-term care as a set of social needs in danger of
otherwise going unfulfilled because of massive, preordained
private sector failure. This perspective might ultimately turn out
to be correct. Certain vital social needs (such as national
defense) require exclusive or nearly exclusive public sector
Before we resign ourselves to an excessive
responses.
governmental role in long-term care financing, however, with all
the problems attendant upon such a policy course, the private
sector should be afforded a fair, even chance to offer alternatives
that-when done correctly-economically empower people to
exercise optimal control over the concluding segment of their
aging journeys.

